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Abstract In thispaper,wepresenta spatialmodeloffishingthatcan be used
to assess someof theeconomicwelfarelossestoproducers
aside
fromsetting
essentialfishhabitat(EFH) areas. Thepaper demonstrates
howspatiallyexmodelsoffishing
are estimated
, howthesemodelscan be used
plicitbehavioral
tomeasurewelfare
lossestofishermen
, andhowthesemodelscan then,in turn,
be usedto simulate
: In developing
thespatialmodeloffishing
fishingbehavior
theworkincorporates
ideasofcongestion
andinformation
and
behavior,
effects,
we showa modification
of standardwelfaremeasuresthataccountsfor these
theseeffects
are tracedthrough
to the
spillover
effects.
Usingthismethodology,
wherewe demonstrate
how thesewelfareand predicted
policysimulations,
sharesneedtobe modified
toaccount
forspillover
effects
from
fleetactivity.
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Introduction
The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, Public Law 104-267, amended the
Magnuson-StevensFisheriesConservationand ManagementAct to establishnew requirementsforprotectingor restoringessentialfishhabitat(EFH). Under theAct,
EFH is definedas "thosewatersand substratenecessaryto fishforspawning,breeding,feeding,or growthto maturity"
(Magnuson-StevensFisheriesConservationand
An
EFH
section
consultationwithNOAA Fisheriesis required
Act,
3).
Management
of all federalagencies undertaking,
or fundingactivitiesthatmay adpermitting,
verselyaffectEFH, regardlessof its location.
Under the Sustainable FisheriesAct, all federalfisherymanagementcouncils
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musttake appropriatesteps to minimizethe potentiallyadverse impactsof fishing
on EFH. This may be accomplishedby imposingmanagementmeasuresincluding,
but not limitedto, fishingequipmentrestrictions,
time/areaclosures, and harvest
limits.Assessing the potentialeconomic ramificationsof regulatoryoptions designed to protect or restore EFH may be extremelycomplicated. The major
complicationis the absence of information
relatingthequalityor conditionof EFH
to futurefishingactivities.The dynamicsand interactions
betweenEFH and future
resourceabundance,availability,and levels are generallyunknown.
Beginningin 2000, the Mid-AtlanticFisheryManagementCouncil (the Council) became concernedwithEFH issues relatingto the surfclamand ocean quahog
fisheries.The Council was preparingAmendment13, whichwas to changethequota
levels forthefisheries.As per therequirements
of theSustainableFisheriesAct,the
Council proposedseveral EFH areas, and draftedfourpotentialclosure optionsto
protectEFH. The draftRegulatoryImpactReview forestablishingthe EFH, however, was rejectedbecause the Council failed to adequatelyconsiderthe possible
economic ramificationsthatmightresultfromthe fourproposed closed areas, as
well as theoptionof no changeor thestatusquo.
In thispaper,we investigatehow a spatial model of fishingcan be used to assess some of theeconomicwelfarelosses to producersfromsettingaside EFH areas.
Since no solid evidence exists concerningthe biological effectsof EFH designations, we present a limited assessment of the potential, short-runeconomic
ramificationsof regulatoryoptions- closed areas- designed to minimizethe adverseeffectsof surfclam( Spisula solidissima)and ocean quahog (Arcticaislándico)
fishingon EFH. It is importantto recognize this limitationbecause a short-run
analysis is likelyto predictonly negativeconsequencesof optionsto protectEFH
(e.g., losses in producerwelfare),whenin fact,theremaybe substantialgains in net
benefitsin thelong run.
The paper demonstrates
how spatiallyexplicitbehavioralmodels of fishingare
estimated,how these models can be used to measurewelfarelosses to fishermen,
and how thesemodels can then,in turn,be used to simulatefishingbehavior.In developing the spatial model of fishingbehavior, the work incorporatesideas of
effects,and we show how standardwelfaremeasures
congestionand information
mustbe modifiedto account for these spillovereffects.Using this methodology,
these effectsare tracedthroughto the policy simulations.While the use of proxy
measuresforcongestionand information
has been done before,we demonstrate
how
these site-specificattributes
affectwelfareand policy simulations.We also identify
those portionsof the fleet most likely to change theirhomeportdue to the EFH
regulations.
The Surfclam and Ocean Quahog Fisheries
Resource Distribution and the Commercial Fisheries
Surfclamsand ocean quahogs are distributedin the NorthwestAtlanticfromthe
Gulfof Saint Lawrenceto Cape Hatteras(Mid-AtlanticFisheryManagementCouncil 1998). Ocean quahogs, however,are also distributed
fromthe Bay of Cadiz of
SouthwestSpain intermittently
across theNorthAtlantic.Both species are relatively
long lived- surfclamsto about35 yearsof age and ocean quahogs to over 100 years
of age. The ocean quahog is recognizedas thelongestlivingbivalve in theworld.
The primarycommercial gear used to harvest both species is the dredge.
Surfclamand ocean quahog vessels are generallydesignedand constructedexclusivelyforharvestingsurfclamsand ocean quahogs, and thus,theycannotbe easily
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to permitfishingin otherfisheries.Since 1994, mostof thelandingsof
reconfigured
surfclamsfromtheExclusive EconomicZone (EEZ) have been takenfromtheMidAtlanticregion. Landings of ocean quahogs have been about evenly distributed
between the New England and Mid-Atlanticranges. Recently,however,landings
fromthe Mid-Atlanticregion have generallybeen higherthan landings fromthe
New England region.Priorto 1990, both surfclamsand ocean quahogs were also
harvestedfromGeorges Bank. Since 1990, therehave been no reportedlandings
fromeast of 69°W longitudebecause GeorgesBank has been closed due to therisk
of paralyticshellfishpoisoning.
Thereare actuallythreedistinctfisheries.Thereis thesurfclamfishery,
whichis
primarilyconductedin the Mid-Atlanticregion.There is an ocean quahog fishery,
whichis conductedin boththeNew Englandand Mid-Atlanticregions.Thereis also
a Maine and Rhode Island fisheryformahoganies,which are also ocean quahogs.
The Maine and Rhode Island fisheriesland smallerquahogs for the live market;
these clams generallycompetewiththe inshorehard clam or quahog, whichoften
clams.
maybe sold as topnecks,littlenecks,and cherrystone
Product Markets, Pricing, and Production
The primaryuse of surfclamshas been in the "stripmarket"to producefriedclams.
In recent years, however,surfclamshave been increasinglyused in chopped or
groundformforotherproducts(e.g., high-quality
soups and chowders).In contrast,
ocean quahogs are generallyviewed as a lower-valuedproduct;theprimaryuses of
quahogs have been soups, chowders,and whitesauces. Quahog meat has a sharper
tasteand darkercolor thansurfclams,whichis whytheyhave not been used in the
morelucrativestripmarket.In 2000, the average ex-vesselprice forsurfclamswas
$8.39 per bushel,while the average annual price forocean quahogs
approximately
was about $4.30 per bushel. The mahoganies typicallycommanda much higher
price.In 2000, theaverageex-vesselpriceformahoganieswas $27.44 perbushel.
In 1991, therewere 121 vessels in the surfclamand ocean quahog fisheries;47
of the 121 vessels landed bothsurfclamsand quahogs. In 2000, therewere 82 vessels in thesurfclamand quahog fisheries,and only 12 vessels landedbothsurfclams
and ocean quahogs. Duringthe 1980s and early 1990s, vessels tendedto jointlyexploit surfclams and ocean quahogs. Since 1995, the percentage of the fleet
exploitingbothspecies has droppedto below 30%. The primaryreasonforthecontractionwas probablygood management.
Management of the Fisheries
Managementof the fisheriesis underthe primaryresponsibilityof the Council.
Priorto 1990, thefisherieswereregulatedby a seriesof commandand controlregulations (e.g., annual and quarterly quotas, minimum sizes, gear and effort
and limitedentry).In 1990, theCouncil establishedan individualtransrestrictions,
ferablequota (ITQ) programto managethefisheries.Permitsand ITQs pertainonly
to surfclamsand ocean quahogs; theydo notpermitharvestingany otherspecies. In
addition,surfclamand quahog vessels are designedsuch that,withoutveryexpensive reconfigurations,
theycannotharvestotherspecies. The originalITQ program
excludedtheMaine quahog fisherybecause theMaine fisherydid notextendto the
EEZ at thattime.It was subsequentlydiscovered,however,thatthe Maine fishery
was movinginto the EEZ, and in 1998, the Council implementedan ITQ program
fortheMaine fishery.
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Spatial Model of Fishing
A Frameworkfor Assessing Short-runWelfareLosses
The usage of closed areas to protectEFH has the potentialto cause substantialreductions in production or landings, ex-vessel revenues, profits,and producer
welfare.Withclosed areas,it would be expectedthatfishingoperatorswould reallocate theireffortspatiallyin orderto minimizetheimpactsof a closure.It would also
be expectedthatpre-EFH closed area strategiesreflecteddecisionsrepresenting
optimalspatialchoices. The need foroperatorsto changefishingareas, thus,would be
expectedto reduce producerwelfarein the shortrun.In the section,we presenta
welfarelosses associated withthe
foranalyzingthe potentialshort-run
framework
variousspatialclosuresconsideredby thecouncil.
Spatial Choice, Congestion, and Assessing WelfareLosses
There is growingliteratureon estimatingthe potentialeconomicbenefitsand costs
of area management(Eales and Wilen 1986; Dupont 1993; Curtis1999; Holland and
Sutinen 1999, 2000; Curtis and Hicks 2000; Smith2002; Wilen et al. 2002; and
Smithand Wilen 2003 a,b). The analyticalframeworkwe offer,therefore,adapts
thismethodologyto analyze changesto producerwelfarelosses fromEFH designations.We initiallydevelop a spatial choice model,whichdescribeshow fishermen
welfare.1
choose fishingareas,to assess thelosses in short-run
One featureof our model is the introductionof potentialcongestioneffects
caused by concentrating
by closingcertainareas of theocean. The imfishingeffort
effectsin themodel of commercialfishermen's
plicationof includingconcentration
spatial choice is exploredparticularlyforthe case of policy analysis and welfare
measurement.
The modelis thenused to estimatetheloss in economicvalue to comassociatedwithclosingareas of theocean.
mercialfishermen
We analyzefourpotentialarea closuresproposedby theCouncil to protectEFH.
not only forsurfclamsand
The fourEFH designatedareas, however,are important
ocean quahogs, but also to numerousothermarinespecies (e.g., summerflounder,
and Americanlobster).The fouroptions,or potentialclosed
sea scallops, monkfish,
areas, are as follows: (i) Option 2 proposes to prohibitclam dredgingon Georges
Bank east of 69°; (ii) Option 3 proposesto prohibitdredgingeast of 70°, 20 minutes; (Hi) Option 6 prohibitsdredgingin the tilefishhabitatareas of particular
concern(HAPC), whichis characterizedas the depthsbetween250 and 1,200 feet
betweenCape Cod, Massachusetts,and Cape May, New Jersey;and (iv) Option 8
closes thewesternextentof theMaine quahog fisheryin theEEZ.2
Our analysisis limitedto onlythesurfclamand ocean quahog fleets.We do not
considerthe potentialimpactson otherfisheries.An important
aspect of analyzing
of theclosed area optionsis thedetermination
thepotentialeconomicramifications
1Weremind
thatthere
couldbe
itis possible
thereader
that,
upontheecological
system,
depending
andBrazee
andWilen2001;Holland
withreserve
creation
"double
dividends"
associated
(Sanchirico
thatpreserve
increase.
Itis alsopossible
bothharvests
andstocks
1996;andHannesson
1998),where
conis a paucity
ofscientific
evidence
forthestock.
Forthisfishery,
there
creation
doesrelatively
little
should
ofas a
creation.
bethought
ofpreserve
Ouranalysis,
theintertemporal
therefore,
cerning
impacts
creation.
examination
ofthecostsofpreserve
short-run
2TheCouncil
ofthese
wererejected
onintheprocess.
considered
Several
early
originally
eight
options.
inthispaper(2, 3, 6, and8) retain
thenumbering
scheme
discussed
Thefourconsidered
sugoptions
forthesakeofcomparability.
gested
bytheCouncil
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of thelikelybehaviorof fishermen
relativeto selectingwhereto fishin thepresence
of spatial closures.We addressthe issue of area selectionby developingan econometricmodel thatrelatesfishingarea choice to areas' expectedrevenues,costs,and
potentialcongestionfromothervessels.
Data and Model Development
The data used to estimatethemodel and conducttheeconomicanalysiswas logbook
data. This data places fishermenin a 10-minutesquare, and providesinformation
thelogbook data providesinformanecessaryformodel specification.In particular,
tionforcharacterizing
historicaveragesby monthforeach area of landingsper unit
effort(LPUE), fishingtime (TIME), the variance of area-specificnet revenues
the
(VAR), and thenumberof tripsin thepreceding30 days (FLEET). Furthermore,
which is used as a basis to
data can be used to characterizea vessel's homeport,3
calculatedistancesto each area underconsideration
by thefisherman.
Defining fishingareas is an importantstep in formulatingthe econometric
model of fishingsite choice. We initiallyconsiderfishingareas to correspondto 10minutesquaresbecause thisis thecommongeographicscale used in data collection
forthe fishery.For the period 1996-2000, clam (quahog) fishermenwere observed
fishingin 160 (279) unique 10-minutesquare areas. For our estimation,we need
monthlyaverages forLPUE, VAR, and TIME, and monthlytotalsforFLEET fora
totalof 12 X 160 (279) area-specificdata pointsforeach variable.Clearly,increasing thenumberof areas thatmustbe includedin themodelincreasestheinformation
and risksspreadinghistoricaldata "too thin"whentryingto characterrequirements
For thesereasons,choice areas were definedbased on
ize area-specificinformation.
30-minutesquares,whichdecreasedthenumberof areas relativeto areas definedby
10-minutesquares. The use of 30-minutesquare areas also increases the level of
geographicaggregationin the model. We eliminatedareas thatwere visited sparingly (or not at all) by fishermen,because it was thoughtthatinclusion of these
areas would notyieldresultsapplicableto thefourclosed area options.4
Additionally,forthe clam and Mid-Atlanticquahog fisheries,a vessel's choice
set was definedbased upon distance fromtheirhomeport.For the clam fishery,
largervessels' (class 2 or 3) choice sets were restrictedas those viable 30-minute
square areas within100 miles, while class 1 vessels were restrictedto those areas
within40 miles of theirport.For the Mid-Atlanticquahog fishery,class 3 vessel
as thoseviable 30-minutesquare areas within150 miles,
choice sets were restricted
class 2 vessels were restrictedto those areas within130 miles, and class 1 vessels
were restrictedto areas within60 miles of theirport.Because the Maine quahog
fisheryis so geographicallycompact,all feasible areas were withinclose range of
by examiningobservedone-way
homeports.These cutoffdistancesweredetermined
distancesin thedata by vessel size. The readershouldnotethatreducingthe spatial
eliminateviable substituteareas.
extentof thechoice set by distancemayarbitrarily
For a discussionon theimplicationsof choice set boundarieson welfaremeasuresin
a recreationdemandcontext,see Haab and Hicks (1997), Hicks and Strand(2000),
Haab and Hicks (1999), and Parsonsand Hauber(1998).
3Becausethere
is nocleardefinition
ofthepoint
ofdeparture
foreachtripinthelogbook
data,weuse
sincenearly
all
andcalculate
baseduponplurality,
theportoflanding
(foryears1996-2000)
homeport
oftrips
atthesameport.
vessels
ended
a vastmajority
4 Siteswithfewer
onaverage,
fortheperiod
wereeliminated
as an
thanfivetrips
1996-2000
peryear,
toensure
that
results
would
tothemost
recent
time
areainanattempt
apply
period.
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Fishingactivitiesbetween1996 and 2000, relatedto surfclams,ocean quahogs,
betweenMaine and Virginia(figures1-3);
and mahoganies,were widelydistributed
thenumberedareas in figures1-3 pertainto 30-minutesquares includedin the spatial choice set. The dark areas representa higherconcentrationof fishing.Based
upon therules fordefiningthechoice set previouslydiscussed,the surfclam,ocean
quahog, and Maine quahog had on average 14.33, 21.92, and 7 areas fromwhich
in therespectivefisheriescould choose.
fishermen
Comparingfigures1, 2, and 3 illustratesthattheMaine fisheryis themostgeographicallycompact,while the Mid-Atlanticquahog fisherycovers significantly
moregroundwithmajoractivityoccurringoffthecoastlinefromMarylandto Masmostof its activity
on theotherhand,concentrates
sachusetts.The surfclamfishery,
offthecoasts of New Jerseyand Delaware.
The Council proposedfourEFH areas (referredto as Options2, 3, 6, and 8) to
protectsurfclams,ocean quahogs, and otherspecies. Since the area closure definitionsoverlappedsome 30-minutesquares,we were not able to preciselymatchthe
proposed closed areas' coordinatesto our definitionof the spatial choice set, we
chose to close the entire30-minutesquare area. Where small partsof a 30-minute
square area were affectedby a closure(e.g., theOption6 closureis an example),an
analysis of a largerclosure was undertakensince our analysis assumed the entire
area was offlimitsto fishing.Consequently,our analysisyieldsa worstcase, or upperboundestimateof theimpactof thevariousoptionson fishermen.

Figure 1. Clam ActualTrips(1996-2000) and Definitionof Choice Set

Short-run
WelfareLosses fromEssentialFish HabitatDesignations

119

Figure 2. QuahogActualTrips(1996-2000) and Definitionof Choice Set

Figure 3. Maine QuahogActualTrips(1996-2000) and Definitionof Choice Set
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The Spatial Choice Model
the
Fishermenlikely choose areas based upon factorsrelatedto site profitability:
LPUE per unittime in an area, the expectedlengthof time spentfishing(TIME),
thefisherman
and thedistanceto thefishingsite (DISTANCE). Furthermore,
might
likelyconsidervariability(eitherin termsof LPUE, TIME, or both) whencomparing one area to another.Additionally,thereis the possibilitythatsome fishermen
will avoid some areas because of possible congestionassociated withhaving too
are likelyto
manyfishingboats on a givenfishingground.Consequently,fishermen
examinehow manyboats have been or are in the area. For our analysis,we use the
numberof vessels (FLEET) and thenumberof vessels squared(FLEET2) in thearea
this proxyof
duringthe preceding30 days as a proxyforcongestion.Admittedly,
effects.
is
also
information
However,
given a paucityof
likelycapturing
congestion
versusavoid congestion,we feel thatthis
data on how fishermenshareinformation
providesa reasonableapproachforcapturingcongestionat highlevels of fleetactivity.The challengeis to estimatea fisherman'sdecision rule forchoosingareas that
balance thesearea-specificfactors.
The area choice model we use was initiallyproposedby Hanemann(1982) and
adaptedto fisheriesby Bockstael and Opaluch (1983). The model allows fortheestimationof decision rules of fishingarea choice thatincorporatesfactorsimportant
forthechoiceincludingtherelative"riskiness"ofdifferent
fishingareas.Thisis particumake withrespectto factorsthey
thetradeoffs
fishermen
larlyusefulforquantifying
s
considerwhenchoosingone fishingarea overothers.In ourapplicationof Hanemann'
inforare assumedto choosethebestsiteby considering
model,fishermen
site-specific
mation such as LPUE, variabilityof profits,distance to the site, etc. Fishermen
each havinguncertainreturns.
choose thebest sitefromamongn alternatives
The workof Bockstael and Opaluch (1983) assumes economic decisionmakers
are expectedutilitymaximizerswhose expectedutilityhas a mean-variancefunca Taylorseriesexpansionof theindividual'sutilityfunction
tionalform.Performing
aroundwealthat sitej yields:

WW,)

=

r
u'w

+

-W° - £(7t,.)f
-,
dku'w° + £(71,.)!
^ ,
U » 1'w
+
I
£<*,)]
j,

<1)

= meannetrevenuesat
whereW° = thefisherman'sinitiallevel of wealth,and E(7Cy)
sitej. By selectinga functionalform,takingtheexpectedvalue of thisfunction,restrictingthe utilityfunctionto depend only upon the mean and variance, and
theequationto conformto a randomutilityframework,
subsequentlyparameterizing
we derivean equationthatcan be estimated:
r
i
EU(Wl)=a'n'w<> + E(nj)' +

ßVar(71,.)
J~- + 5FLEET + fyFLEET
2 + e ..
r
+
2[W° E(nj)'

( 1')

writeas v(Wj)
Equation (T) is a reduced formof how fleetsize should enterthe indirectutility
function.Notice thatthe errorterm,£,,is site-specific.The fishermanthenchooses
sitei ifthesiteis thebestplace to fishoutofthesetofall possiblefishingchoices,S:
EU(Wļ) > EU(Wj) V/,j e S .
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as TypeI GeneralAssumingthatthearea-specificarea terms,e;, are distributed
ized ExtremeValue, we can writetheprobability
thatarea i is chosenas:
=

ev(w¡)

•
£ gV(W;)
jzS

(2)

Using maximumlikelihoodtechniques,we can recovertheparametersa, ß, 8, and (|)
of tripsfollowingclosures.A priori, we expecta > 0,
and predicttheredistribution
<
>
and
<
since
all thingsequal, anglers would choose sites with
8
0,
0,
0,
(ķ
ß
We expectthattheeffectof vessel activhigherexpectedprofitsor lowervariability.
ity would be positive at lower levels, since the presence of othervessels might
indicateto the captainthatsuccessfulfishingoperationsare being undertakenat an
area. However,whenthenumberof tripsexceeds some thresholdlevel, theeffectof
are less likelyto choose thatalternative.
congestionis feltand fishermen
Mean profits(net of fishingand steamingtravelcosts) at each area were calculated by monthto yield an estimateof E(7i;). Profitlevels per vessel were estimated
available in McCay and Brandt(2001). From McCay and
using cost information
Brandt,we calculated average cost relationshipsforthe threefisheriesconsidered
here. Specifically,it was determinedthatsteamcosts were,on average,$6.40/mile
forthe surfclamfleetand $5.52/milefortheMaine and Mid-Atlanticquahog fleets.
Additionally,it was determinedthatdredgetime forthe two fleetscosts approximately$40/houronce on the fishinggrounds.Our estimateof E(7ij) forthe Maine
and Mid-Atlanticquahog fleetis calculatedas follows:
= TIME(quahog)
j
*
*
*
[pRICE(quahog) LPUE(quahog)¡ $4o] $6.40 DISTANCE r
E(Kj)

For thesurfclamfleet,ourestimateof E(7Cj)is:
- TIME(surfclam)
E(Kj)
j
*
*
*
7 $4o] $6.40 DISTANCE^.
[PRICE (surfclam) LP UE (surfclam)
The variables TIME (average numbers of hours fished while on the fishing
grounds),PRICE (averagepricebased upon a vessel's homeportdesignation),LPUE
(the averagecatchperhourwhileon fishinggrounds),and DISTANCE (thedistance
fromthevessel's homeportdesignationto thecenterof thefishingground)werecalculatedusinghistoricaldata foreach of thethreefisheriesfortheperiod 1996-2000
to yield per-month
averages.We calculatedthe varianceof nj foreach monthand
30-minutesquarearea to yieldVar(7C;).
Following Hanemann(1982), the measurementof welfarechanges can be accomplished via numerical methods by calculating the expected value of
compensation(C) fora closureof certainareas in thechoice set thatholds expected
maximumutilityconstant (with expectations taken over the site-specificerror
terms):
V°[W° + E(n)°,Var(n)0,Fleet0] = Vl[W° + E(n)° + C,Var(n)°,Fleet1],

(3)
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wheretheexpectedmaximumutility(EM AX) fora choice occasion, Vk[W°+ E(tc)°,
Var(7c)°,Fleet*],is equal to:
+
+ C,Var(nj)°, Fleet*] + £,, V/ e
¿šļmaxļi/[w0 E{Hjf
S'}].5,6
Notice EMAX is takenover theoriginalset of fishingalternativesS to yield Voand
takenover only those sites remainingopen afterthe EFH designation(S1) to yield
V1.Therefore,C is the amountof compensationnecessaryaftertheclosureof some
sitesto hold utilityat a level as if theclosuresneverhappened.The expectationsoperatorof theEMAX functionis theresearcher'sexpectationtakenovere;.
The expectedutilityfunction(V1) dependson the fleet'sarea choices post closure.This complicatesthestandardwelfareanalysisas typically
used in applicationsof
theRUM model,sinceeach vessel'spreferences
on
other
choicesin thefleet.To
depend
accountforthisinterrelationship,
we employan iterative
procedureforreallocatingthe
fleetfollowinga closure.The stepsof thisprocedureare outlinedbelow:
1. Assigninitialguess forsite-specificprobabilityfunctions.
numberone,theguessis simplythevector7C°usingequation
a) If thisis iteration
(2) foreach area. If an area is closed,theobservedtripactivityis reallocated
to otheropenareasproportionally
to observedactivity
in theopenareas.
b) If thisis notthefirstiteration,thevector7t1(whichis equal to 7t2from
previous iteration)is used.
2. Using the guess forthe site-specificprobabilities,calculate the updatedpredictionfortheexpectedvalues of FLEET and FLEET2 foreach area and trip
in thedata.
3. Using the updatedvalues of FLEET and FLEET2 foreach area, calculate the
updatedpredictedprobabilityvector7t2.
4. Repeat steps2-3 untill^1 - 7t2|<0 (For thisstudy,0 was set at .001.).
5. Otherwise,assign the finalvalues of FLEET and FLEET2 followingthe closureforeach area. Calculatethefinalpredictedchoice probabilities(7t).
Using thefinalpredictedvalues of FLEET and FLEET2, thencalculatethefinalestimateof V1thatincorporates
congestionand information
spillovereffects.
The goal of the estimationproblemis to recoverstructuralparametersof the
individual'sutilityfunctionthatreveal information
abouthow fishingsites are chosen. In orderto implementequation (1'), we estimatedvessels' initialwealth,W°;
for each
expected profits,E(tc;); and the variance of area-specificprofits,Var(7Cy)
area consideredby thefishermen.
FollowingBockstael and Opaluch (1983), we approximatedW°by thevalue of thevessel.7
5 To solveforC, weemploy
thebisection
method
forfinding
rootsfora one-dimensional
equation.
Whilemoreefficient
numerical
methods
wefound
mayexisttofindrootsofanequation,
(3)
equation
converged
quickly.
6Work
torecreation
demand
andKling(1999)hasinvesti(1995)andapplied
byMcFadden
byHerriges
withcalculating
welfare
whentheindirect
gatedthebiasassociated
changes
usingtheEMAXfunction
function
is nonlinear
inincome.
Webelieveourapproach
a
utility
usingtheEMAXfunction
provides
reasonable
fortheshort-run
welfare
lossofareaclosures,
sincethese
havenotinapproximation
papers
thisbiaswithourfunctional
form
andmostpoliciesimposea relatively
smallchangein
vestigated
individual's
choiceopportunities.
7Becauseofinadequate
dataonfishing
firms'
current
levelsofwealth,
weadopttheapproach
ofKitts,
andRobertson
demonstrates
thatthevalueofthevesselandgear(i.e.,anap(2000),which
Thunberg,
valueofwealth)
is approximately
orannual
ex-vessel
revenue.
proximate
equaltooneyear'sgrossstock
Thisrelationship
is assumed
toapply
totheclamandquahog
vessels
inthisfishery.
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Results and Policy Simulation
The results(table 1) confirma prioribeliefsabouthow fishermen
balance thevarious factorsinfluencingfishingsite choice. Fishermenwere more likely to choose
sitesthatare moreprofitable(whichcould meancloser,less costly,or higherLPUE)
or less likely to choose sites withhigh variability.They were also more likely to
choose sites wherea significant
activitywas occurringuntilthelevel of activityexceeded a thresholdlevel and thentheywere less likelyto choose sites. All results
were significantat the 5% level of significance,and the model likelihoodratiotest
statistic(versus a model whereall parametersare equal to zero) indicatesthatthe
model is preferred
at the 5% level of significance.Since one of theprimaryuses of
themodelwill be forpredictingwherefishermen
will fishonce area closuresare enacted usingequation(2), we also constructa goodness-of-fit
measureby calculating
the percentageof observationswherethe model predictsthe actual choices of individuals (based upon theobservationwiththehighestcalculatedprobability).Results
forthisstatisticshow thatrelativeto a naïve predictionof theinverseof thenumber
of choices in thechoice set,each choice modelpredictschoices well.
Short-runWelfareLosses
In orderto understandthe impactof the potentialEFH regulationson each of the
threefisheries,considertable 2. First,the table illustratessome variabilityin landings and revenues during the years 1996-2000. We constructa status-quo or
referencelevel of permits(numberof boats), trips,landings,revenues,and prices,
by takingthe fleetaverage forthe years 1996-2000. Ratherthanchoose the latest
yearin thedata (2000), we feltthatdefiningthefleetbaseline level over a five-year
timeperiod was a reasonableway to eliminatenoise thatmightcause year-to-year
to theanalysis.The table also illustrates,in the
fluctuations
thatare notconstructive
finalfourrows,thatfleetactivityforeach of the EFH closure areas is minimalin
comparisonto overalltotals.
Of the fouroptions,only Option 3 has potentiallycatastrophiceffects,which
because the entirefishingarea forthisfleetis
pertainto the Maine quahog fishery,

Table 1
Site Choice Model ParameterEstimates(t-statistics
reportedin parenthesis)
Parameter
a
ß
8
<p
X2(all parms=0)
Average#Choices
% Predicted
Correctly

Clams

Quahogs

ME Quahogs

11.23
(19.01)
-682.72
(14.13)
0.11
(84.67)
-0.00071
(52.11)
21,843.22
14.33
37.74

25.05
(29.29)
-50.77
(3.67)
0.16
(69.96)
-0.0018
(37.97)
16,673.36
21.92
25.74

30.35
(11.23)
-95.28
(4.32)
0.05
(57.36)
-0.00011
(42.04)
18,738.66
7
74.01

* Allparameters
atthe5%level.
significant
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closed by thisoption.Options3 and 6 have thepotentialto impactthequahog fishery,since a significantnumberof vessels, trips,and revenuesare derivedfromthe
offshoreareas impactedby Option3. For theclam fishery,
Options3 and 6 will imbut
of
since
the
activities,
majority activitydoes not occur so far
pact fishing
offshore,the impactis likelyto be much smallerthanthe quahog fishery.Finally,
Option 8, which has ramificationsonly forthe Maine quahog fishery,has only a
The 1996-2000 average
minimalimpacton theMaine quahog or mahoganyfishery.
annual numberof tripsto the areas relatedto Option 8 equaled only 14, and thus,
theimpactsof thisoptionwould be expectedto be small.
Analyzingthe effectof closures by lookingat observedactivityin areas does
EFH areas are forhisprovidecontextforwho will be affectedand how important
toricfishinggrounds.This typeof analysisignores,however,how fishermen
might
respondto area closures.It is unlikelythattheywould completelystop fishingduring timesusuallyspentfishingin EFH areas. Rather,it is morelikelythattheywill
respondby shiftingtheireffortto otherareas. To model thesetypesof reactionsin
the contextof our estimatedbehavioralparametersand model presentedabove requires some modificationfromthe standardwelfarechanges analysis. Notice that
thesite-specificexpectedutilityfunction(equation V) includesthevariablesFLEET
and FLEET2, which are intendedto capturethe effectof othervessels' choices on
the currentchoice for a vessel. As areas are closed due to EFH designations,the
fleetwill re-optimizetheirlocationchoices in orderto maximizeindividualprofits
given regulatoryconstraints.Consequently,the standardwelfareanalysis (in which
otherdecisionmakers'choices do not affecta person's currentchoice) must be
effectsor crowding.In orderto
amendedto accommodatetheeffectof information
model thewelfareeffectsand choice probabilities,we conducttheiterativeanalysis
as describedin theprecedingsection.
We use the model to estimatepolicy-relevant
outputsthatdescribeimpactsand
EFH
closures
considered.
from
the
Changes in welfarewere
being
likelyresponses
calculatedusingequation(3). First,we calculateC, thewelfaremeasurethatequates
post-closurewiththebaselinepre-closurelevel of expectedutility.This measurecan
be thoughtof as an at-the-dock
facingthearea closureswould
paymenta fisherman
need to be paid to compensateforthearea closure.This paymentwould compensate
himforchangingexpensesrelatingto traveland fishingat a site,a changein LPUE
and variabilityof profits,and changingconditionswithregardto fleetcongestion
and information.
Consequently,the measureembodies all of the factorsunderlyingthe decision
rule presentedin equation 1'. For each of thepolicies, we calculate C per trip(table
3). First,Option2 does notimpactthespatialchoice set of anyof thethreefisheries,
so thereare no appreciablewelfarechangesto measure.Option3 completelycloses
since a
theMaine quahog fisheryand has some implicationsforthequahog fishery,
clam
has
distance
from
shore.
The
of
its
does
occur
a
fair
fishery
activity
portion
small measurableimpactssince fishinggrounds(for the area-choiceanalysis) are
mostlywestof thecutoffline. The exceptionis forboats steamingout of theportsin
thenorthern
rangeof theclam fishery(Rhode Island- and Massachusetts-basedvessels). These vessels are affectedmorethanvessels based out of New Jerseyor points
area in theoffshoreareas of theMid-Atsouth.Option6, whichcloses a significant
lanticregion,has significantimpacts(relativeto per-triprevenues)on the quahog
imFinallyOption8, has significant
fisheryand,to a lesserdegree,theclam fishery.
of
the
Mid-Atlantic
but
has
no
effect
on
either
on
the
Maine
fishery,
quahog
pacts
fisheries.
It is important
to notethateven thoughmostof theseoptionshad minorimpacts
on fleetactivitybased upon historicalfishingpatterns,C compensatesall fishermen
fortheEFH closuresas long as theyhave some probabilityof choosingan affected
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Table 3
Mean WelfareChangePer Trip
Policy

Clams

Quahogs

ME Quahogs

Option1: StatusQuo
Option2: CloseGeorgesBank
eastof70d20m
Option3: Closewaters

No Impact
No Impact
$2.01a

No Impact
No Impact
$1,064.89

Area
Option6: CloseTilefish
Option8: WestofME Zone 1
AverageRevenueperTrip

$70.89
No Impact
$10,908.94

$2,636.62
No Impact
$8,088.59

No Impact
No Impact
Closure
Complete
ofFishery15
No Impact
$888.06
$1,215.88

Notes:
a Fora portion
3
orRhodeIsland,Option
Massachusetts
ofobservations
(where
portstatewaseither
nowelfare
effect
couldbecalculated.
Forthese
feasible
closedalloftheir
vessels,
fishing
options.
bBecausethisoption
itis notmathematically
fortheMainequahog
closesall fishing
fishery,
grounds
forthispolicy.
a welfare
tocalculate
change
possible
fortheMaine Option8 closure.Even though
thisis important
fishingsite.In particular,
is observedin EFH areasduringtheperiod1996-2000,the spalittleactivity
relatively
tial extentof thefisheryis quite small,and theclosureaffectsan area wherea large
have a relativelyhighpredictedprobabilityof choosing.
numberof fishermen
we also predictlikelyvessel area choices resultingfromthe
(2),
Using equation
closures.For quahogs,a significant
portionof thereallocatedeffortoccursjust west
of the closure area offthe coast of southernMassachusettsand Rhode Island. The
is predictedto maintaineffortin the Mid-Atlantic
clam fishery,largelyunaffected,
regionon historicalfishinggrounds.Option6 had an impacton the quahog fishery
because manyof theMid-Atlanticoffshoreareas were no longeravailable to fishermen. The predictedresponseis to move activityfromthe offshoreareas inshore,
eithernorthward
towardLong Island and Rhode Island or westwardtowardNew Jerin thenearershoreareas
activityis predictedto concentrate
sey.For clam fishermen,
offof New Jersey.Option8, the closureof the westernextentof the Maine quahog
is predictedto resultin a higherconcentration
of vessels in theprimaryfishfishery,
ing grounds.8
Table 4 containsan estimateof thetotalwelfareimpactforeach of theEFH closures underthe baseline quota levels assumingno changesin trips.These numbers
theupperboundlosses associatedwithimposingEFH restrictions.
The
demonstrate
clam fisheryis affectedthe least across all EFH optionsrelativeto the otherfisheries consideredhere. Quahogs (for Options 3 and 6) suffera significantloss when
comparedto totalfleetrevenues.Option8 also significantly
impactstheMaine fishery with an economic welfare loss associated with the area closure to be a
significant
portionof statusquo revenues.
forhavingto
Recall thatthesewelfaremeasuresnotonlycompensatefishermen
reallocatetheireffortintoless profitableareas,butit also accountsforfleetcongestion and variabilityof profitsassociated with areas. Consequently,as areas are
reallocatetheiractivity,such thata higherconcentration
of efclosed and fishermen
fort(e.g., Option 8 in Maine), fishermenhave higher economic welfare loss.
Similarly,EFH closures mightalso force fishermento select areas where the resourceabundanceis uncertainor landingspertriptendto be highlyvariable,and the
8Mapsofpredicted
areavailable
from
theauthors.
activity
post-closure
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Table 4
Economic
from
EFH
Yearly
Impact
options:No TripChangesandNo Changein Quotas
Fishery
Surfclam

Quahog

ME Quahog

EFH Option
StatusQuo
Option2
Option3
Option6
Option8
StatusQuo
Option2
Option3
Option6
Option8
StatusQuo
Option2
Option3
Option6
Option8

Per-trip
(C)
Compensation
0
0
$2
$71
0
0
0
$1,065
$2,637
0
0
0
Closure
Complete
0
$888

Trips
2,114
2,114
2,114
2,114
2,114
2,137
2,137
2,137
2,137
2,137
1,898
1,898
0
1,898
1,898

Total
Compensation
0
0
$4,228
$150,094
0
0
0
$2,275,905
$5,635,269
0
0
0
Closure
Complete
0
$1,685,424

welfaremeasurewill compensatethemfora greaterimpactsince it takes into accountall of thefactorsunderlying
theestimateddecisionrule.
Our proxyforcongestionis undoubtedlyentangledwithinformation
effects.If
betterdata were available to disentanglecongestionand information,
it is likelythat
congestioneffectswould have been morepronouncedin model estimatesand policy
simulationscenarios.
Conclusions
In this paper,we have demonstrated
how to move fromconceptualmodels of site
choice to models of fishingbehavior.These behavioralmodels may thenbe used to
measurechangesin welfareand predictedsharesresultingfromEFH designations.
Our analysis demonstrates
thatshort-run
impactson fishermencan be quite large.
be
if
Longer-term
impactsmight dampened thefleetmoves to different
portsor fisheries in an effortto lessen the impactsof the restrictivearea closures.Also, there
benefitsgeneratedfromEFH regulations.Because of
may be substantiallong-term
however,we were unable to considerthose potentiallonginadequateinformation,
termbenefits.For two policies consideredin this paper,some portionof the fleet
was essentiallyshutdown; thatis, theirspatial choice set was closed completely.
The modelspresentedheredo notcapturethewelfarelosses to thesefirms,since the
model makesno allowance forportchangesor otherlonger-term
changesthatmight
the
effect
of
the
closures.
mitigate
The model we presentoffersa methodof incorporatingthe effectsof other
fisher'schoices into an individual'schoice model. Our model allows vessel operatorsto re-optimizetheircurrentchoice whenfaced withclosuresby makinga guess
as to whatthe restof the fleetmay do and thenchoose theirbest area accordingly.
Using such a modelintroducessome complicationsforwelfareanalysisand estimatthese
ing post-policyspatial choice shares.We presenta methodforincorporating
spillovereffectsintopolicy and welfareanalysis.While crowdingdid not prove to
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be a majordriverof area choice in thiscase, theremaybe otherfisheriesforwhich
thiscould be a significantproblem.For thesefisheries,crowdingmustbe included
in theanalysisof EFH closures.
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